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ON CONSTRUCTIVE AXIOMATIC METHOD
ANDREI RODIN
Abstract. The received notion of axiomatic method stemming from Hilbert is not fully
adequate to the recent successful practice of axiomatizing mathematical theories. The
axiomatic architecture of Homotopy type theory (HoTT) does not fit the pattern of
formal axiomatic theory in the standard sense of the word. However this theory falls
under a more general and in some respects more traditional notion of axiomatic theory,
which I call after Hilbert and Bernays constructive and demonstrate using the Classical
example of the First Book of Euclid’s Elements. I also argue that HoTT is not unique
in the respect but represents a wider trend in today’s mathematics, which also includes
Topos theory and some other developments. On the basis of these modern and ancient
examples I claim that the received semantic-oriented formal axiomatic method defended
recently by Hintikka is not self-sustained but requires a support of constructive method.
Finally I provide an epistemological argument showing that the constructive axiomatic
method is more apt to present scientific theories than the received axiomatic method.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper, which surveys different ways of using axioms in mathematical practice,
Dirk Schlimm [43] provides the following general definition of axiomatic theory and claims
that it applies to “all instances of axiomatics from Euclid to the present” (op. cit. pp.
43-44):
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I consider an axiom system to consist of a number of statements (the ax-
ioms) and a notion of consequence, which is employed to derive further
statements from them; the resulting axiomatic theory includes all state-
ments that are derivable from the axioms and which might also contain
terms that are defined from the primitive terms that occur in the axioms
(i.e., the primitives of the system). (op. cit., p. 40)
By a “statement” the author understands here either a meaningful proposition (the case of
material aka contentful axiom system) or a propositional form, which becomes a meaningful
proposition through an interpretation (op. cit., p. 44) 1.
The above definition is fairly standard. At the first glance it appears that it covers ev-
erything that can be reasonably called an axiomatic theory. My aim is to persuade the
reader that this is not the case. For this end I shall point to certain theories, which are
commonly called axiomatic but which do not fall under the above definition. Then I shall
propose a broader notion of axiomatic theory (and of axiomatic method), which covers
these problematic cases. As the reader will see such problematic cases are not marginal
and exotic but belong to the mainstream mathematics of different epochs including to-
day’s mainstream mathematics. In short, in this paper I argue that the received notion of
axiomatic method is biased and propose an improvement.
My main examples are (i) Euclid’s geometrical theory of Book 1 of his Elements (see
Section 5) and (ii) the recent Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT, see Section 8), which makes
part of a new perspective foundations of mathematics called Univalent Foundations (UF,
see [6]). I argue contra Schlimm (see op. cit. p. 50) that if one reads Euclid carefully
and avoids any hasty modernization of his text then one is not in a position to qualify
his geometrical theory as an instance of (contentful) axiomatic theory in Schlimm’s sense.
1 Schlimm claims, in full generality, that “any finite set of axioms can be reduced to a single axiom by
conjunction” (op. cit., p. 67). Since conjunction is a logical operation on propositions (and by extension -
also on propositional forms) I conclude that in Schlimm’s understanding the axioms qualify as propositions
or propositional forms.
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Although the overall importance of Euclid’s Elements for the axiomatic thinking is hardly
contestable one may still argue that the particularities of Euclid’s axiomatic approach,
to which I attract the reader’s attention, are archaic and today may have only historical
significance. This is why the case of HoTT-UF, which represents the edge of the current
mathematical research, is more essential for my argument. I shall show that HoTT-UF
does not qualify as an axiomatic theory in the received sense of the term either. Even
if the significance of UF for the whole of today’s mathematics remains controversial, it is
clear that this theory reflects an important part of the mainstream mathematical practice
of last decades. I shall argue that the special character of the axiomatic architecture of
HoTT represents a wider trend in the 20th century logic and mathematics (Sections 6, 7).
The fact that the axiomatic architecture of HoTT also shares certain key features with the
old good Euclid’s geometry is an additional reason why I believe that the received notion
of axiomatic method established in the 20th century is biased.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section I discuss the received
notion of axiomatic method and make explicit some epistemological assumptions, which
are usually associated with this method. In Section 3 I overview the continuing discussion
on constructive aka genetic method started by Hilbert [11]. In Section 4 I motivate and
introduce the notion of emphconstructive axiomatic method, which combines the key fea-
tures of the genetic method and the received axiomatic method. In Section 5 I treat the
historical example of Euclid’s Elements, Book 1 and show that Euclid’s axiomatic theory
qualifies as constructive in the relevant sense of the term. In Section 6 I discuss the notion
of Curry-Howard correspondence and its role in the Categorical logic. This Section serves
me as a necessary historical and theoretical preliminary to Sections 7 and 8 where I treat
two modern examples of axiomatic theories: Topos theory and HoTT. In the concluding
Section 9 I argue that the constructive axiomatic method has some important epistemolog-
ical advantages over the received axiomatic method, which make it more apt to prospective
applications in physics and other natural sciences. This latter discussion is construed as a
critique of the recent account of axiomatic method given by Hintikka [15].
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2. The Received Views on the Axiomatic Method: Semantic and Syntactic
Approaches
At an early stage of his life-long work on axiomatic foundation of mathematics (1893-1894)
Hilbert describes his notion of well-founded axiomatic theory as follows:
Our theory furnishes only the schema of concepts connected to each other
through the unalterable laws of logic. It is left to human reason how it wants
to apply this schema to appearance, how it wants to fill it with material.
([9], p. 104)
The two key features of this notion of theory are (i) its schematic character and (ii) its
logical grounding. Let me first focus on (ii). Hilbert refers to the “unalterable laws of logic”
as something definite and somehow known. A weaker assumption which we may attribute
to Hilbert and which still allows us to make sense of his words is that the laws of logic
are epistemically more reliable than any specific mathematical and scientific knowledge, so
these laws should serve as a foundation for all mathematical and scientific theories.
The assumption of fixity of logic is crucial for understanding the schematic character (i) of
Hilbert-style axiomatic theories. Axioms and theorems of non-interpreted formal theory are
propositional forms, which admit truth values (and thus turn into full-fledged propositions)
through an interpretation. An interpretation of a given propositional form amounts to
assigning to terms like “point”, “straight line”, etc. certain semantic values, which can
be borrowed from another mathematical theory or from some extra-theoretical sources
like intuition and experience [15]. One and the same propositional form (and hence one
and the same axiomatic theory), generally, admits multiple interpretations. In order to
make sense of the idea of propositional form one needs a further assumption, which is the
following. The game of multiple interpretations does not equally concern all terms of a
given schematic theory. Some terms, namely logical terms, have fixed meanings, which (at
least in the early versions of Hilbert’s axiomatic approach) is supposed to be self-evident.
The different treatment of logical and non-logical terms reflects assumption (ii) according
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to which logical concepts are epistemically prior. In practice this assumption requires to
“fix logic” first and then use it as a tool for building various axiomatic theories in a view
of their intended models.
Although Schlimm’s definition of axiomatic theory does not commit one to any particular
epistemological view on logic, his examples of “imaginary”, i.e., non-interpreted axioms
([43], p. 44) are all of the same sort: they contain some meaningful logical terms and
some meaningless (i.e., open to multiple possible interpretations) non-logical terms. This
lets me think that the fundamental epistemic assumption (ii) about the logical grounding
of axiomatic theories makes proper part of the received view on the axiomatic method as
described in Schlimm’s paper.
As it stands Schlimm’s definition of axiomatic theory identifies such a theory with a set
of “statements”, i.e., propositions, related by some relation of logical inference aka deriv-
ability. Let us now consider the case when the axioms are schematic and formulated in a
certain symbolic language with a precise syntax (like in ZF). Then we have at least two
possibilities for specifying the wanted relation of logical inference: it can be construed ei-
ther (i) syntactically as a part of the language (in symbols A ⊢ B) or (ii) semantically as
follows: B follows from A just in case when:
In all interpretations where A is true B is also true.
(in symbols A |= B; a more precise definition of semantical consequence is given in Section
9 below). If the two relations coincide extensively on the set of all propositions of some
given axiomatic theory T then T is said to be semantically complete.
Whether the syntactic consequence relation (i) or the semantic consequence relation (ii)
is epistemically prior is a subject of continuing philosophical controversy. Taking the
latter semantic view, one may go further and identify a theory with a class of its models
rather than with any particular axiom system together with all theorems derivable from
the given set axioms. (Notice that one and the same class of models can be, generally
speaking, axiomatized in many different ways.) In a different paper Schlimm considers this
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controversy and quite rightly stresses the fact that it remains wholly within the scope of the
received notion of axiomatic method [42]. Schlimm makes this claim contra van Fraassen
who defends a strong version of semantic view (identifying a scientific theory with the
class of its models) and on this ground denies the relevance of axiomatic method in science
altogether ([51], p. 65). Unlike Schlimm I don’t think that van Fraassen’s rejection of the
received axiomatic method results from a simple terminological confusion. After all the
lack of any significant impact of the axiomatic approach onto the mainstream 20th century
physics (unlike the 20th century mathematics) is evident and, in my opinion, needs a better
explanation. My tentative explanation is this: the way in which an axiomatic theory (in
the received sense of the term) specifies the class of its model is not appropriate (or at least
not sufficient) for building physical models. The constructive axiomatic method discussed
below in this paper is expected to fix this major shortcoming of the received method. I shall
come back to this issue and provide an argument supporting these claims in the concluding
Section 9.
3. Genetic method versus Axiomatic method
In this Section I overview the continuing discussion on the constructive aka genetic method
of introducing mathematical concepts and building mathematical theories, which often (but
not always as we shall shortly see) is opposed to the (received) axiomatic method. I show
that the distinction between the methods of theory-building is not quite clear-cut and for
this reason needs a revision.
The current discussion on the genetic method goes back to Hilbert’s early paper on the
concept of number ([11], English translation [12], where the author explains how the con-
cepts of whole, rational and real numbers can be construed from (or as Hilbert puts this
“engendered [erzeugt] by”) the concept of natural number (provided that this latter con-
cept is taken for granted). This can be done in a number of ways, differences between which
are not essential for Hilbert in this context. In particular, real numbers can be construed
either as Dedekind cuts or as Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, rational numbers
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can be construed as pairs of whole numbers numbers, and whole numbers - as pairs of
natural numbers. Such procedures Hilbert calls genetic and opposes them to axiomatic
procedures. He remarks that historically the genetic method has been used in arithmetic
while the axiomatic method has been used only in geometry. Assuming that
[d]espite the high pedagogic and heuristic value of the genetic method, for
the final presentation and the complete logical grounding of our knowledge
the axiomatic method deserves the first rank. ([12], p. 1093)
Hilbert develops then an axiomatic theory of arithmetic.
The distinction between the two methods has been widely discussed in the later literature
[4], [5], [35] 2 , [47], most recently by Elaine Landry [18]. Landry uses this distinction
for making an argument against Feferman’s claim according to which axiomatic theories
of categories (such as EM, ETCS and CCAF, see [32]) cannot serve as an independent
foundations of Category theory and of the rest of mathematics because they all allegedly
use some prior notions of collection (or class) and operation. Landry argues back that these
notions are used only for a genetic underpinning of Category theory but play no role in the
logical axiomatic foundation of this theory stricto sensu. Instead of defining a category in
terms of classes of things called “objects” and “morphisms” Landry proposes to think of
axiomatic theories of categories as follows:
[T]he category-theoretic structuralist simply begins by assuming the exis-
tence of a system of two sorts of things (namely “objects” and “morphisms”)
and then brings these things into relationships with one another by means
of certain axioms. (op. cit. p. 44)
In a following footnote Landry explains that
What is doing the work here is neither the notion of a system nor the notion
of an abstract system, rather it is the Hilbertian idea of a theory as a schema
2 Piaget calls the genetic method operational.
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for concepts that, themselves, are implicitly defined by the axioms. Thus
we don’t need a “fixed domain of elements” [..], we do not need a system
as a “collection” of elements [..] (op. cit. p. 44) 3
For reasons, which I cannot discuss here I do believe together with Landry that a proper
axiomatic construction of Category theory should not logically depend on any prior notion
of class. However I am not convinced by her argument and do not think that axiomatic
theories like EM, ETCS and CCAF (in the received sense of “axiomatic”) indeed achieve
this goal. My objection to Landry is this. (For saving space I shall refer to EM; to ETCS
and CCAF my argument applies similarly.) First of all, I assume (following [15]) that EM
requires a notion of semantic consequence making part of its underlying logic. In order
to construe the relation of semantic consequence properly one needs to fix some formal
semantical framework (again as a part of the logical machinery). When one uses for this
end a Tarski-style model-theoretic semantics it does involve some notion of class (collection,
universe) of individuals. In this case thinking about categories introduced through EM in
terms of classes is not just a convenient way of representing categories, which has evident
heuristic and pedagogical values, but a proper part of the very axiomatic construction of
EM, which belongs to its logical machinery. Thus in this case Landry’s argument doesn’t
go through. Now one may look for a different logical machinery using a different formal
semantics, which may allow one to construe the notion of semantic consequence without
using the notion of class or similar. However Hilbert’s notion of theory as a schema referred
to by Landry does not immediately provide such an alternative semantical framework. The
only way to get around this objection that I can see is to take a strictly syntactic view on
the axiomatic method and thus get rid of the notion of semantic consequence altogether.
Following Hintikka [15] I believe that this notion is an essential element of the axiomatic
method, and so such a price is unacceptable.
3 Interestingly Landry diverges here from a later Hilbert’s view according to which a “fixed” domain is
a hallmark of formal axiomatic method, see the quotes from [13] In Section 4 below.
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The purpose of the above argument is not to settle the axiomatic foundations of Category
theory (this topic lies outside of the scope of this paper) but demonstrate that the dis-
tinction between the genetic and the axiomatics methods is less clear-cut than it might
seem. Whether the class-based definition of category is qualified as axiomatic or genetic
depends on one’s general ideas about logic and logical semantics, which can be a subject
of philosophical controversy. If one takes Tarski-style logical semantics to be a part of
logic then the class-based definition of category counts as fairly axiomatic. But Landry’s
“category-theoretic structuralist” sees the same definition as merely genetic.
4. Constructive Axiomatic Method
In this Section I introduce a generalized method of theory-building, which includes the
received axiomatic method as well as the genetic method as special cases. After Hilbert
and Bernays I call this generalized method the constructive axiomatic method. I also trace
here some historical origins of this idea.
4.1. The Idea. The lack of clear-cut distinction between the genetic and the (received)
axiomatic method suggests the idea of combining the two method into one. The common
ground that I use for combining the two methods is the concept of rule. On the one hand,
any axiomatic theory comprises rules for handling propositions, which we commonly call
logical rules (or logical laws) 4. On the other hand, any genetic theory comprises rules for
handling objects of non-propositional types such as arithmetical or geometrical objects.
Just as logical rules regulate forming further propositions (theorems) from certain given
propositions (including axioms), genetic rules regulate forming further objects from cer-
tain given objects. Now think of a theory, which comprises a set of rules, which apply to
4 As it is well-known a deductive system can be formally presented either in Hilbert style (i.e., with
many logical axioms and only few rules) or in Gentzen style (with many rules and few axioms). A Gentzen
style presentation may have zero axioms. But a Hilbert-style system needs at least one rule (usually modus
ponens). The notion of deductive system without rules obviously doesn’t make any sense while logical
axioms (aka tautologies) are dispensable
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propositions as well as to objects of some other types. I shall call such a theory construc-
tive axiomatic theory and call the method of building such a theory constructive axiomatic
method. This general notion of constructive axiomatic theory allows for using different sets
of rules. This concerns both logical rules (different axiomatic theories may involve different
logical calculi) and non-propositional “genetic” rules (different theories may allow for dif-
ferent procedures of object-construction). The proposed notion of constructive axiomatic
theory is more general than the received notion of axiomatic theory because a constructive
axiomatic theory directly operates with objects of multiple types while an axiomatic theory
in the received sense of “axiomatic” directly operates only with propositions.
One may now remark that propositions typically tell us something about certain non-
propositional objects (but may also tell us something about other propositions and about
themselves). Thus an axiomatic theory which involves only propositions (axioms and
theorems), i.e., an axiomatic theory in the received sense of the word, typically deals with a
bunch of non-propositional objects. The mechanism of aboutness which links propositions
to non-propositional objects is complicated and not yet fully understood[53]. An essential
element of this mechanism is the (semantic) reference, which allows for interpreting non-
logical terms in (non-interpreted) axioms and theorems as described in Section 2 above.
Having this remarkable feature of propositions in mind one may wonder whether there is
indeed a need to modify the received notion of axiomatic theory by including rules for
non-propositional types on equal footing with logical rules.
My answer to this question is twofold. The first part of the answer comes from my analysis
of mathematical practice: I show that the theory of Book 1 of Euclid’s Elements (Section
5) and the recent HoTT (Section 8) simply do not qualify as axiomatic theories in the
received sense of the term but do qualify as constructive axiomatic theories in the above
sense. The second part of the answer derives from an epistemological argument developed
in Section 9. I disagree with the view according to which the genetic method of theory
building has only certain heuristic and pedagogical significance and argue that it is also
needed for construing the concept of semantic consequence properly. On this ground I claim
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that an axiomatic theory in the received sense of the term always needs to be supported
by certain mathematical constructions built genetically.
The notion of constructive axiomatic theory provides a better theoretical framework for
analyzing this situation than the talk about two different notions of theory (genetic and
axiomatic) because it allows one to specify more clearly the interplay between propositional
and non-propositional objects and the corresponding rules for operating with these objects.
In Section 8 I show that Martin-Lo¨f’s Type theory (MLTT) can be used as a formal
framework for such an analysis.
4.2. Some Historical Sources. The idea of combining the genetic and the (received)
axiomatic methods into one method of theory-building is not entirely new. I shall mention
here three sources from the earlier literature where this idea is discussed in some form.
This list is not supposed to be complete and it doesn’t include more recent discussions,
which I review in other parts of this paper.
1) Vladimir Smirnov in his 1962 paper on the genetic method [47] argues that an adequate
modern formalization of genetic theories can be achieved not through their axiomatization
(by which he understands a presentation of such theories “in the form of axiomatic calcu-
lus where rules of inference [..] control the transition from one proposition to another”)
but rather through a “direct formalization of recursive techniques, i.e., of algorithmic pro-
cesses”. For this end, the author argues, one should “broaden the scope of logic” by
considering “stratagems of actions” and “such forms of thought as prescriptions and sys-
tems of prescriptions” as a properly logical subject-matter (op. cit. p. 275-276). We can
see that even if Smirnov keeps the genetic and the axiomatic methods apart he tends to
consider them from a common logical point of view.
2) A similar idea aiming at broadening the scope of logic has been put forward in a different
context earlier by Kolmogorov [16] in the form of “calculus of problems”. As the author
explains in a later note, his 1932 paper
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was written with the hope that the logic of solutions of problems would later
become a regular part of courses on logic. It was intended to construct a
unified logical apparatus dealing with objects of two types - propositions
and problems. ([17], p. 452)
In Section 6 I shall explain how this Kolmogorov’s idea relates to Curry-Howard correspon-
dence and today’s Categorical logic including Topos logic.
3) The relationships between the genetic and the axiomatic methods are described by
Hilbert and Bernays in the Introduction to their two-volume Foundations of Mathematics
[13], (Eng. tr. [14]). This Introduction first published in 1934 provides a picture, which
significantly diverges from what Hilbert says about the same issue in his 1900 paper [11]
reviewed in the last Section. Here is how Hilbert and Bernays see the relationships between
the two methods in 1934:
The term axiomatic will be used partly in a broader and partly in a nar-
rower sense. We will call the development of a theory axiomatic in the
broadest sense if the basic notions and presuppositions are stated first, and
then the further content of the theory is logically derived with the help of
definitions and proofs. In this sense, Euclid provided an axiomatic ground-
ing for geometry, Newton for mechanics, and Clausius for thermodynamics.
[..]. [F]or axiomatics in the narrowest sense, the existential form comes in
as an additional factor. This marks the difference between the axiomatic
method [in the narrow sense?] and the constructive or genetic method of
grounding a theory. While the constructive method introduces the objects
of a theory only as a genus of things, an axiomatic theory refers to a fixed
system of things [..] given as a whole. Except for the trivial cases where
the theory deals only with a finite and fixed set of things, this is an idealiz-
ing assumption that properly augments the assumptions formulated in the
axioms. ([14], p. 1a)
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We can see that this time Hilbert includes the genetic (aka constructive) method as well as
the formal (aka schematic) axiomatic method under the scope of the concept of axiomatic
method in the “broadest sense”. What exactly is this new “broadest” notion of being
axiomatic? Whether or not Hilbert understands here the genetic method in the same sense
as he did this in his 1900 paper?
The received notion of being axiomatic suggests the following reading. Hilbert has changed
his earlier idea of genetic method and in 1934 identified it with the traditional contentful
(material) version of the (received) axiomatic method. In this case the “broadest” ax-
iomatic method in the above quote is the same as the received axiomatic method. The
distinction made by Hilbert and Bernays in the above quote is one between the contentful
and the schematic versions of axiomatic method.
The above reading does not seem me convincing. Here is just one reason why. In the same
Introduction we find the following interesting remark:
Euclid does not presuppose that points or lines constitute any fixed domain
of individuals. Therefore, he does not state any existence axioms either,
but only construction postulates. (op. cit. p. 20a)
The Editors of the English edition of this text (C.-P. Wirth, J. Siekman, M. Gabbay, D.
Gabbay) rightly notice here that
[u]nless we see construction as a state-changing process, this [Hilbert and
Bernays’ ] remark is actually not justified: From a static logical point of
view, existence sentences are always implied by construction postulates (op.
cit. p. 20, footnote 20.3)
I choose to read the above passage charitably and assume that Hilbert and Bernays do
see Euclid’s geometrical constructions as state-changing processes, i.e., as genuine genetic
constructions in the sense of Hilbert’s 1900 paper. Now given that (i) Hilbert and Bernays
qualify Euclid’s theory as axiomatic in the “broadest” sense and that (ii) the identification
of the “broadest” axiomatic method with the received notion of axiomatic method implies
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that Hilbert and Bernays’ remark about Euclid is obviously erroneous, I conclude that (iii)
Hilbert and Bernays’ “broadest” axiomatic method is broader than the received axiomatic
method and includes the genetic method in the sense of Hilbert’s 1900 paper. Thus if I am
right the idea of combined genetic/axiomatic method is already present in [13].
In addition to the general idea and the name I take from Hilbert the following insight.
Recall that in [11] Hilbert qualifies as genetic the introduction of real numbers through
Dedekind cuts (on sets of rational numbers) and through Cauchy sequences of rational
numbers. Unless some further precautions are taken (for example, by saying that all Cauchy
sequences in question are Turing computable) these ways of introducing new theoretical
objects obviously do not qualify as constructive in anything like the usual sense of the
term - whether this later sense of being constructive is made precise through the concept
of Turing computability, through the concept of general recursiveness or in any other way,
which determines what does it mean to “construct” a mathematical object in terms of
certain procedures (like computation) and rules for these procedures. Understandably
Hilbert finds the naive genetic “constructions” of Dedekind cuts and Cauchy sequences
to be epistemically unreliable and proposes instead to build the theory of real numbers
axiomatically. Nevertheless I find it useful and interesting to develop (in a modern context)
Hilbert’s general notion of mathematical construction (in [11] ), which is not limited by any
particular set of “constructive” procedures (and rules for such procedures) and may cover,
in particular, this naive Dedekind’s construction. Notice that the modern received notion of
axiomatic theory does not specify by itself any particular logical calculus, which can be used
for building such a theory. Similarly the right general notion of being constructive should
not, in my view, delimit any particular set of “constructive” procedures. This general
notion should allow one to specify such procedures differently for different constructive
theories.
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5. Euclid: Problems versus Theorems
In this Section I show that the geometrical theory of Euclid’s Elements, Book 1, if one
read it verbatim and avoids convenient paraphrasing, qualifies as a constructive axiomatic
theory (in the sense explained in the last Section) but not as an axiomatic theory in the
received sense of the word.
Euclid’s theory is based on 5 Axioms (aka Common Notions), 5 Postulates and 23 Defini-
tions. The special historical character of Euclid’s Common Notions and Definitions is not
relevant to the present discussion, so I leave them apart and focus on Postulates. The first
three Postulates are as follows (verbatim after [7]):
[P1:] to draw a straight-line from any point to any point.
[P2:] to produce a finite straight-line continuously in a straight-line.
[P3:] to draw a circle with any center and radius.
As they stand the three Postulates are not propositions and admit no truth-values. Hence
they cannot be axioms in the received sense of the word. In their original form the Postu-
lates cannot be used as premises in logical inferences - if by logical inference one understands
an operation that takes some propositions (premises) as its input and produces some other
proposition or propositions (conclusion) as its output 5. In fact Postulates 1-3 are them-
selves schemes, aka rules, of certain basic operations, which take some geometrical objects
5 The non-propositional character of Euclid’s Postulates has been earlier noticed by A. Szabo, see [49],
p. 230. More recently K. Manders [27], [28] stressed the fact that the Greek “mathematical demonstrative
practice” as represented by Euclid does not reduce to its propositional content, which is made explicit
through “the notions of mathematical theory and formal proof on which so much recent work in philosophy
of mathematics is based” ( [28], p. 68). This remark shows that Manders’ reading of Euclid is compatible
with mine. However I don’t follow Manders when he describes the non-propositional content of Euclid’s
proof as a special feature of his “practice”. Having in mind the notion of constructive axiomatic theory
I consider Euclid’s non-propositional Postulates as proper elements of his theory . I don’t deny that the
difference between theory and practice makes sense in this context but I disagree with how exactly Manders
draws this distinction here.
16 ANDREI RODIN
as input and produce some other geometrical objects as output. P1-3 qualify as rules in
the same sense of the term in which one usually talks about rules of inference in logic.
However P1-3 apply to geometrical rather than to logical operations. The table below
specifies inputs (operands) and outputs (results) for operations falling under P1-3:
operation type input output
P1 two (different) points straight segment
P2 straight segment (extended) straight segment
P3 straight segment and one of its endpoints circle
These operations are partly composable in the obvious way: the output of P1-operation
is used as input for P2- and P3-operations. This system of operations extended by some
further basic operations assumed tacitly 6 serves Euclid for introducing objects of his the-
ory. Such an introduction is systematic in the sense that it does not reduce to a simple act
of stipulation: it is a procedure, which involves certain elementary operations (including
P1-P3) and complex operations obtained through the composition of the elementary oper-
ations. As soon as the term deduction is understood liberally as a theoretical procedure,
which generates some fragments of a given theory from the first principles of this theory,
one can say that Euclid’s geometrical constructions are deductive. The deductive order of
geometrical constructions can be called in this case the genetic order. As we shall shortly
see in Euclid’s theory such a “constructive deduction” is tightly related to the more familiar
kind of logical deduction, which operates with propositions. In what follows we shall see
how the same phenomenon arises in Topos theory (Section 7), MLTT and HoTT (Section
8).
Postulates and Axioms of are followed by the so-called Propositions. This commonly used
title is not found in Euclid’s original text where things called by later editors “Propositions”
are simply numbered but not called by any common name [7]. From Proclus’ Commentary
6 Including the construction of the intersection point of lines in an appropriate position, compare Prop.
1 of Book 1. For further details see [34]. The incompleteness of P1-3 has no bearing on my argument.
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[37], (Eng. tr. [38]) written in the 5th century A.D. we learn about the tradition dating
back to Euclid’s own times (and in fact even to earlier times) of distinguishing between the
two sorts of “Propositions”, namely Problems and Theorems. Euclid’s Theorems by and
large are theorems in the modern sense of the word: propositions followed by proofs. But
Problems are something different: they are derived rules for making complex geometrical
constructions. Like Postulates Problems admit no truth-values and thus don’t qualify as
propositions either. Unlike Postulates Problems always require a justification aka solution.
This is why I call these further rules derived. As we shall now see Euclid’s Problems are
not solved on the basis of (and hence are not derived from) P1-3 and tacit constructive
rules alone: the propositional part of Euclid’s theory also plays a role in it. 7.
Indeed what is said so far may suggest that Euclid’s theory splits into two separate parts:
one consisting of constructive rules derived from Postulates and the other consisting of
propositions derived from Axioms. Such a split does not occur for two complementary
reasons (which I formulate informally):
- (solutions of) non-trivial Problems require (propositional) proofs, which show that the
obtained constructions have the required properties;
- (proofs of) non-trivial Theorems require constructions, which are conventionally called
“auxiliary”.
This explains why the logical deductive order of Theorems and the genetic order of Prob-
lems in Euclid’s theory do not exist independently but form a joint deductive order 8.
7 As an example of Problem consider the initial fragment of Proposition 1, Book 1: “To construct an
equilateral triangle on a given finite straight-line”. It is followed by (i) an appropriate construction and
(ii) a proof that the obtained construction is equilateral triangle. For interpretation of this Proposition as
a rule see [34], p. 93. Panza says here that this Proposition “provides a new constructive rule”. I make a
stronger claim saying that this Proposition (which is not a proposition in the usual logical sense) is this
new rule. Saying that I distinguish as usual between a given Problem (= constructive rule) and solution of
this Problem, which justifies this rule.
8A more detailed analysis of this deductive structure is found in [41], ch.2.
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The above observations are fairly straightforward and can hardly remain unnoticed by any
attentive reader of Euclid. Why in this case Schlimm [43] and many other authors tend
to think of Euclid’s theory as a system of propositions? An obvious explanation is this.
All Euclid’s Postulates and initial fragments (i.e., bare formulations) of Problems can be
easily paraphrased into propositions. This can be done at least in two different ways. The
following paraphrases of P1 are self-explanatory:
P1m (modal): Given two (different) points it is always possible to produce a straight
segment from one given point to the other given point.
P1e (existential): Given two (different) points there exists a straight segment having these
given points as its endpoint.
P1e instantiates what Hilbert and Bernays call the “existential form” used in their formal
axiomatic method. The key logical feature of this paraphrase (which it shares with P1m) is
this this: it translates Euclid’s non-propositional Postulates and Problems into propositions
(in case of P1e - to existential propositions). For further references I shall call a procedure,
which aims at replacement of all non-propositional content of a given theory by some
suitable propositional content, the propositional translation of this theory 9.
There are different ways of thinking about propositional translation of given theory T . In
particular, this procedure may be conceived of as
(i) a purely linguistic procedure, i.e., a special kind of linguistic paraphrasing, which helps
to present the theoretical content of T in the standard propositional form;
(ii) a procedure, which separates the theoretical content of T from its non-propositional
9 In addition to my proposed reading of Postulates 1-3 as formation rules for non-propositional types
and the familiar propositional reading one may also consider reading Postulates 1-3 as specific functions
from one type of geometrical objects to another. Unlike my proposed reading this latter functional reading
doesn’t go through for P2, which has no definite outcome. Indeed different operations realized with the
same operands may well comply to the same rule (as in the case of rules of chess) while a value of any
function needs to be fixed for any of its argument. A more general historical objection against the functional
reading is that the general concept of function is wholly absent in Euclid.
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content, which has no theoretical significance;
(iii) a procedure, which transforms T into a new theory T ′ which, generally, has a different
theoretical content.
Each of (i) and (ii) is sufficient for justifying the identification of Euclid’s theory with
the result of propositional translation of this theory. I believe that those authors who
readily accept such an identification usually have in their minds some combination of
these two assumptions. However in my view both these assumptions are erroneous. (i)
is ruled out by the remark that making up a proposition from something, which is not
a proposition, is not innocent from a logical point of view. The type difference between
propositions and non-propositions matters logically and hence theoretically. Notice that
the propositional translation of Elements, Book 1, is a matter of its logical reconstruction
rather than merely linguistic paraphrasing. It doesn’t work as straightforwardly as it does
with single Postulates. (ii) depends on a strong epistemological assumption according to
which all theoretical knowledge is a propositional knowledge, i.e., the knowledge-that [8].
This strong assumption deserves a special discussion, which I postpone until Section 9
where I argue that this assumption is not acceptable either.
Thus my working understanding of propositional translation will be (iii). Accordingly I
do not identify Euclid’s theory of geometry presented in Elements, Book 1 with the result
of any propositional translation of this theory. Since Euclid’s theory in its original form
includes a non-propositional content in the form of Problems and Postulates I claim that
this theory is an instance of constructive axiomatic theory in the sense of Section 4 but
not an instance of a purely propositional axiomatic theory, i.e., of an axiomatic theory in
the received sense of the word 10.
10 Thanks to Proclus we know that the idea of propositional translation of Problems into Theorems
is very old. From the same source we also know about the contemporary competing idea of translating
Theorems into Problems of a special sort (see [38], p. 63-64). Here is the relevant passage:
Some of the ancients, however, such as the followers of Speusippus and Amphinomus,
insisted on calling all propositions “theorems”, considering “theorems” to be a more
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6. Curry-Howard Correspondence and Cartesian Closed Categories
The present Section is a historical and theoretical preliminary to the following two Sec-
tions 7, 8 where I treat modern examples of axiomatic theories. In a nutshell the idea of a
Curry-Howard correspondence is given in Kolmogorov’s 1932 paper [16] (already discussed
in Section 4) where the author establishes that his newly proposed calculus of problems has
the same algebraic structure as the intuitionistic propositional calculus published earlier in
1930 by Heyting 11. It turns out that this correspondence is extendible onto a large class of
symbolic calculi including those, which have been developed independently and apparently
appropriate designation than “problems” for the objects of the theoretical sciences, es-
pecially since these sciences deal with eternal things. There is no coming to be among
eternals, and hence a problem has no place there, proposing as it does to bring into being
or to make something not previously existing - such as to construct an equilateral triangle
[..]. Thus it is better, according to them, to say that all these objects exist and that we
look on our construction of them not as making, but as understanding them [..] Others,
on the contrary, such as the mathematicians of the school of Menaechmus, thought it
correct to say that all inquiries are problems but that problems are twofold in character:
sometimes their aim is to provide something sought for, and at other times to see, with
respect to determinate object, what or of what sort it is, or what quality it has, or what
relations it bears to something else.” ([38], p. 63-64).
Speusippus [408 - 338/9 B.C.] is Plato’s nephew who inherited his Academy after Plato’s death. Amphi-
nomus is otherwise unknown (except few other references found in the same Commentary) Speusippus’
contemporary. Menaechmus [380 - 320 B.C.] is mathematician of Plato’s circle. The dates of these people
suggest that these ideas had been already around for quite a while before Euclid completed his Elements
at some point between 300 and 265 B.C. .
11 Artemov stresses that the Curry-Howard correspondence doesn’t provide a general formal semantics
for Kolmogorov’s calculus of problems, which is known as BHK-semantics (after Brouwer, Heyting and
Kolmogorov) [1]. However Curry-Howard serves as a more special constructive computational semantics
for the same formal structure (the intuitionsistic calculus). Some historical material concerning the history
of Curry-Howard correspondence can be found in [3] and [46] but a more focused historical study on the
development of Kolmogorov’s logical ideas and of the concept of Curry-Howard correspondence still waits
to be written.
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for very different purposes. So there were established a number of correspondences (i.e., of
more and less precise isomorphisms) between (proof-related) logical calculi (propositional,
first-order or higher-order), on the one hand, and computational calculi (the simply-typed
lambda calculus, type systems with dependent types, polymorphic type systems), on the
other hand [48]. This led to the so called “proofs-as-programs and propositions-as-types”
paradigm in logic and computer science where propositions are treated as types of ob-
jects (namely of their corresponding proofs) along with other (non-propositional) types
of objects belonging the same theory 12. Within this paradigm building proofs is a spe-
cial case of building theoretical objects in general. Notice that a constructive axiomatic
theory in the sense of Section 4 similarly allows for building systems of propositions (i.e.
deriving theorems from axioms) on equal footing with building various non-propositional
constructions.
The Curry-Howard correspondence shows that certain symbolic calculi of different kinds
share a common structure. It is natural to ask whether this shared structure can be
presented in some invariant way, which would not depend on particularities of syntactic
presentations of these symbolic calculi. This problem has been solved in 1963 by means
of mathematical Category theory by Lawvere [22], who observed that certain categories
called Cartesian closed categories (CCC) “serve as a common abstraction of type theory
and propositional logic” ([24], p. 1). In 1968-1972 this observation has been developed
by Lambek into what is now known under the name of Categorical Logic. The three way
correspondence between (i) logical calculi (propositions), (ii) computational calculi (types)
and (iii) (objects of) CCC and some other appropriate categories) is called in the literature
the Curry-Howard-Lambek correspondence [25].
Let me now tell a bit more about a relevant part of Lawvere’s work that touches upon
the issue of axiomatic method directly. Lawvere discovered CCC during his work on an
12 I emphasize that we are talking here about the same theory because propositions and proofs of given
theory can be also made into objects otherwise, namely, by considering them as objects of a metatheory of
the given theory. But this is a different matter.
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alternative axiomatization of Set theory 13. His idea was that the non-logical primitive of
standard axiomatic Set theories like ZF, namely the binary membership relation ∈, was
badly chosen. Lawvere suggested to use instead the notion of function and the binary
operation (i.e., ternary relation) of composition of functions. The resulting axiomatic
theory is known as the Elementary Theory of Category of Sets (ETCS) [19], [23], [32].
This proposal may appear radical to one who has habituated oneself to ZF and its likes
but as it stands this proposal does not require any modification of the standard formal
axiomatic method. The new choice of primitives allowed Lawvere to see that the condition
of being CCC makes part of the wanted axiomatic description of the category of sets
(Set). In this context the further observation that CCC provides a structural description
of Curry-Howard correspondence appears as a bonus.
Let us see more precisely what happens here. The standard axiomatic approach requires to
fix logic first and then use it for sorting out intuitive ideas about sets, numbers, spaces and
whatnot. If one encounters then some difficulties of a logical nature one may try to modify
the assumed logical principles and try this again. However in the case of ETCS something
different happens: the axiomatization reveals the fact that Set is equipped with its proper
internal logically-related structure, namely CCC, which is not simply transported from the
chosen background logic but emerges as a specific feature of category Set.
Although this fact does not prevent one from construing ETCS as a standard formal
axiomatic theory [32] it suggests a reconsidering the place and the role of logic in this
theory. In the next Section we shall see how the similar case of axiomatic Topos theory
connects to the idea of constructive axiomatic method.
7. Topos theory
The concept of topos first emerged in Algebraic Geometry in the circle of Alexandre
Grothendieck around 1960 as a far-reaching generalization of the standard concept of
13 Lawvere also had other important motivations for introducing CCC, see [20].
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topological space and didn’t have any special relevance to logic. In his seminal paper
[21] Lawvere provided an axiomatic definition of topos called today elementary topos 14.
Like ETCS the axiomatic theory of elementary topos does not bring by itself any unusual
notion of axiomatic theory. However any systematic exposition of topos theory contains a
chapter on the internal logic of a topos. In standard textbooks the internal logic is intro-
duced as an extra feature on the top of the basic topos construction [32], [26]. As usual
it has a syntactic part (Mitchel-Be´nabou language) and a formal semantic part, which in-
terprets the Mitchel-Be´nabou syntax in terms of constructions available in the base topos
(Kripke-Joyal semantics). Kripke-Joyal semantics assigns to symbols and syntactic expres-
sions, which have an intuitive logical meaning (logical connectives, quantifiers, truth-values,
etc.), explicit semantic values, which otherwise can be called geometrical (since the base
topos is a generalized space). This is not something wholly unprecedented in the history of
the 20th century logic: think, for example, of Tarski’s topological semantics for Classical
and Intuitionistic propositional logic [50]. However this feature of Kripke-Joyal semantics
makes it quite unlike a notion of semantics derived from the idea of interpreting a for-
mal theory by assigning explicit semantic values only to its non-logical elements (compare
Section 2 above).
Internal logic LT can be used for developing further axiomatic theories “internally” in
given topos T . It also provides an additional “internal” description of T itself ([32], Ch.
16). If one looks at Lawvere’s [21] where the axioms for elementary topos first appeared
in the press, one can see that namely the internal logical analysis of topos concept allows
Lawvere to formulate these axioms: Lawvere observes that the internal logical properties of
general topos and the internal logical properties of Set share the CCC property (cartesian
closedness) and this observation helps him to obtain the wanted axioms for Topos theory
14 The title “elementary” reflects the fact that Lawvere’s definition (unlike Grothendieck’s original
definition) is expressible in the standard first-order formal language [32]. The concept of elementary topos
is more general than that of Grothendieck topos: there are elementary toposes, which are not Grothendieck
toposes. A precise axiomatic characterization of Grothendieck toposes is given by Giraud’s axioms, see [26],
p. 575.
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through a modification of ETCS axioms. Although Lawvere didn’t use the notion of internal
logic of a given category in its explicit form of Mitchel-Be´nabou language, he figured out
how standard logical concepts (propositional connectives, truth-values, modality, etc.) can
be “encoded” into this given category:
[A] Grothendieck “topology” appears most naturally as a modal operator,
of the nature “it is locally the case that”, the usual logical operators, such
as ∀, ∃, ⇒ have natural analogues which apply to families of geometrical
objects rather than to propositional functions. [..] [I]n a sense logic is a
special case of geometry. ( [21], p. 329)
I consider this Lawvere’s observation as a genuine logical analysis of Grothendieck’s geo-
metric topos concept and at the same time observe that it is quite unlike the kind of
logical analysis, which led Hilbert to his axiomatic theory of Euclidean geometry [10]. Un-
like Hilbert, Lawvere does not use logic as a ready-made tool (recall Hilbert’s “unalterable
laws of logic”) for sorting out certain informal geometrical concepts. Instead Lawvere’s
analysis reveals a specific logical framework within the given geometrical concept. This in-
ternal logical framework remained wholly unnoticed by Grothendieck and his collaborators
when they first developed the topos concept.
One may argue that the specific character of Lawvere’s logical analysis, which I have just
stressed, can matter only when we are talking about the way and the context in which
the axioms for the elementary topos have been first obtained but not when we are talking
about the axiomatic topos theory in its accomplished form. This argument goes through
as far as one uses the received notion of axiomatic theory for distinguishing the final result
from the context of its discovery. However this case suggests a reconsidering of this received
notion. Indeed Lawvere’s dictum “logic is a special case of geometry” is incompatible with
the construal of Topos theory as axiomatic theory in the received sense of “axiomatic”.
For the standard architecture of axiomatic theories is based on the assumption according
to which the scope of logic L used for building some theory T is broader than the scope of
T . By this I mean precisely that L can be used not only for reasoning in T but also for
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reasoning elsewhere, say, in theory T ′. Let T be the standard axiomatic Topos theory as in
[32], L be Classical (or Intuitionstic) first-order calculus and T ′ be ZF (or its Intuitionistic
version). I can see no sense in which L can be called as a special case of geometry in this
standard setting. Logic L can rather be described here as a common background for a large
spectrum of theories, which includes geometrical as well as non-geometrical theories.
At the same time Lawvere’s idea of logic as a part of geometry makes perfect sense if by
T one understands a hypothetical constructive axiomatic theory of toposes (in the sense
of “constructive” specified in Section 4 above) and by L - the propositional segment of
T . Since T is a geometrical theory (because toposes belong to geometry) its objects are
geometrical objects. These geometrical objects are of various types including the type of
propositions. Thus propositional objects 15 are geometrical objects of sort and logic, by
Lawvere’s word, is a special case of geometry. 16.
By the date such a constructive axiomatic theory of toposes doesn’t exists in an accom-
plished form. However I have shown in this Section how Lawvere’s work on axiomatization
of Topos theory relates to the idea of constructive axiomatic theory 17. In the next Section
I describe a more recent theory which uses a constructive axiomatic architecture explicitly
and thus serves me as a major motivation for this concept (along with historical motivations
mentioned in Section 4.2 above).
15As we shall shortly see in MLTT such objects are identified with proofs of their corresponding
propositions.
16 Lawvere’s general ideas about logic are strongly motivated by Hegel’s logic and in particular by
Hegel’s distinction between the objective and the subjective logic. Hegel’s inclusion of the subjective logic
into the objective logic corresponds to Lawvere’s inclusion of logic into geometry. For further details see
[41], Section 5.8.
17 For a discussion on constructive aspects of Category theory and Topos theory see [33]. This discussion
is useful but it ignores the aspect of constructivity, which I just have stressed in the main text.
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8. Homotopy Type theory and Univalent Foundations
Homotopy Type theory (HoTT) is a recently emerged field of mathematical research, which
has a special relevance to philosophy and logic because it serves as a basis for a new tentative
axiomatic foundations of mathematics called the Univalent Foundations (UF)[52], [6]. In
this paper I do not attempt to review HoTT and UF systematically but only describe a
special character of its axiomatic architecture.
HoTT emerged through a synthesis of two lines of research, which earlier seemed to be
quite unrelated: geometrical Homotopy theory and logical Type theory. The key idea is
that of modeling types (including the type of propositions) and terms (including proofs)
in Type theory by spaces and their points in Homotopy Theory. Beware that along with
basic spaces Homotopy theory also studies path spaces where “points” are paths in the
basic spaces, spaces of “paths between paths” called homotopies, spaces of “paths between
paths between paths” and so on. All these higher-order spaces are also used for interpreting
types.
Like in Topos theory, in HoTT geometry and logic are glued together with appropriate
category-theoretic concepts. The central categorical concept used in HoTT is that of
ω − groupoid. In the standard category theory a groupoid is defined as a category where
all morphisms between objects are reversible, i.e., are isomorphisms. ω-groupoid is a higher-
categorical generalization of this concept (called in this context 1-groupoid) where usual
morphisms are equipped by morphisms between morphisms (called 2-morphisms), further
morphisms between 2-morphisms (called 3-morphisms) and so on up to the first infinite
ordinal ω). An analogy between spaces equipped with paths between points, homotopies
between those paths, etc. is straightforward. It allows for mixing the geometrical and the
categorical languages and talk interchangeably, e.g., about “spaces of paths”, “groupoids
of paths” and “groupoids” simpliciter.
The axiomatic HoTT uses Constructive Type theory with depended types due to Martin-
Lo¨f [31] (MLTT) for turning the tables at this point. The notion of ω-groupoid aka
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space aka homotopy type is taken as primitive while the notions of proposition, set, (one-
dimensional) groupoid, category, etc. are construed as derived notions with MLTT. Types
(and, in particular, propositions) and terms (and, in particular, proofs) in MLTT are in-
terpreted, correspondingly, as spaces and points of these spaces. I skip further details. The
obtained interpretation of MLTT in the categorically construed Homotopy theory directly
translates all constructions in MLTT into geometric constructions. Then one may consider
some further axioms such as the Axiom of Univalence (AU), which gives its name to the
Univalent Foundations. In this paper I consider HoTT (with or without AU) only as an
axiomatization of modern Homotopy theory. The idea of UF according to which HoTT can
be used for developing the rest of mathematics has no bearing on my argument but implies
that the special character of HoTT axiomatic architecture may be of general importance
for logic and mathematics.
The constructive character of HoTT is already fully present in MLTT. Unlike ZF and
other standard formal axiomatic theories, MLTT is not a system of propositions or propo-
sitional forms. MLTT construes propositions as a particular type of things among other
non-propositional types 18 . It comprises rules, which apply to types and their terms in
general and to propositions and their proofs in particular. In MLTT, “the mathematical
activity of proving a theorem is identified with a special case of the mathematical activity
of constructing an object - in this case, an inhabitant of a type that represents a propo-
sition” ([6], p. 17). Since in MLTT the object construction does not reduce to proving
propositions this theory qualifies as constructive axiomatic theory (in the relevant sense)
but not as an axiomatic theory in the received sense. The unusual perspective on logic pro-
vided by MLTT has been earlier noticed by Michael Rathjen and described in the following
words:
18By propositions I mean here what in [6] is called “mere propositions”: a type P is a mere proposition
if for all x, y : P we have x = y (op.cit. p. 103). In a more general sense each type can be described as a
proposition through the Curry-Howard correspondence.
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The interrelationship between logical inferences and mathematical construc-
tions connects together logic and mathematics. Logic gets intertwined with
mathematical objects and operations, and it appears that its role therein
cannot be separated from mathematical constructions. [..] [L]ogical op-
erators can be construed as special cases of more general mathematical
operations. ( [40], p. 95)19
The homotopical interpretation of MLTT (namely, the ω-groupoid interpretation) brings
geometry into the picture 20 and thus makes this case more similar to Euclid’s. For example,
MLTT validates the following rule (as a special case of a more general rule that I shall not
discuss):
(F): Given types A,B to produce type A→ B of functions with domain A and codomain
B.
Under the homotopical interpretation this rule becomes
(HF): Given spaces A,B to produce space A → B of continuous maps from space A to
space B,
which has the same form as Euclid’s First Postulate allowing for producing a straight
line from a given point to another given point 21. Once again I would like to stress that
the non-propositional form of (F) and (HF) just as the non-propositional form of Euclid’s
Postulates 1-3 is not only a matter of one’s favorite style of axiomatic presentation. The case
19Notice the analogy with Lawvere’s view on logic as a special case of geometry.
20 In addition to the homotopical ω-groupoid model HoTT with AU has other “natural” models [2].
Studying and comparing these models from an unified viewpoint largely remains an open research problem.
However the ω-groupoid model plays a special role in foundations of mathematics because it supports the
idea of reconstructing the world of today’s everyday mathematics using homotopy types as its building
blocks. This idea represents what Marquis calls the “geometrical point of view” in foundations of math-
ematics [29], [30], which this author opposes to the more familiar Quinean “logical point of view” [39]. I
leave a further discussion on this foundational issue for another occasion.
21 For another analogy between HoTT and Euclid’s geometry see [6], p. 56-57.
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of MLTT/HoTT allows us to see this more clearly than Euclid’s case. The type difference in
general and the difference between the type of propositions and non-propositional types in
particular belongs to the core of MLTT/HoTT, so we cannot switch here between different
types for free. Surely (F) and (HF) can be given a propositional form in a meta-language.
However this remark has no bearing on my argument since we are now talking about MLTT
and HoTT (i.e., develop an informal metatheory of these theories if one likes) but not
discussing the logical form of possible representations of MLTT and HoTT in metatheories
of these theories. In MLTT/HoTT propositions has their proper place and rules (F)/(HF)
also have their proper place. These places are different. Metatheoretical propositional
translations of (F)/(HF) do not belong to MLTT/HoTT and cannot be treated on equal
footing with those propositions, which do so. It would be interesting to develop a formal
theory of possible metatheoretical propositional translations for rules in MLTT/HoTT and
I leave this task for a future research. So far I only claim that the propositional translation
of these rules is a meta-theoretical procedure but not just a possible informal interpretation
of the same formal structure. 22. Claiming that HoTT is a constructive axiomatic theory I
need to pay a particular care for disambiguating the term “constructive” properly. MLTT
is constructive in a strong sense, which makes this theory computable. It is not known
to the date whether or not HoTT with AU is constructive in the same strong sense or
not; prima facie it is not ([6], p. 11). But in any event HoTT with AU is constructive
in the sense of being constructive which I use in this paper. This amounts to saying that
HoTT with AU includes non-propositional types along with the type of propositions. As I
have already said HoTT inherits this feature from MLTT. However only in HoTT the non-
propositional types are identified as types of certain geometrical objects while in MLTT in
its original form such types are presented as a bare type-theoretic abstraction.
22 Compare Section 5 above on propositional translation of Euclid’s Postulates 1-3.
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9. What is Constructive Axiomatic Method?
In the preceding Sections I motivated, introduced and demonstrated with some examples
the concept of constructive axiomatic theory. In this final Section I would like to evaluate
this concept from an epistemological viewpoint. As my point of departure I shall take
Hintikka’s recent paper [15] where the author defends a semantic version of received ax-
iomatic method and analyses its epistemological significance. I shall try to show that this
received method of theory-building is not self-sustained (both logically and epistemically)
and needs to be supported by a constructive method like one used in HoTT.
Hintikka:
What is crucial in the axiomatic method [..] is that an overview on the
axiomatized theory is to capture all and only the relevant structures as so
many models of the axioms. ([15], p. 72)
Where these structures come from? Hintikka gives the following answer:
The class of structures that the axioms are calculated to capture can be
either given by intuition, freely chosen or else introduced by experience
(ib., p. 83)
One may wonder how a mathematical structure or a structure of some different sort can be
“given” or “introduced” without being construed axiomatically beforehand. Should we take
at this point a Platonistic view according to which mathematical structures in some form
exist independently of our axiomatic descriptions of these structures? Hintikka’s answer
is different. He rejects the notion of intuition understood as an intellectual analogue of
sense-perception and describes the relevant notion mathematical intuition as follows:
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[N]ew logical principles are not dragged [..] by contemplating one’s mathe-
matical soul (or is it a navel?) but by active thought-experiment by envis-
aging different kinds of structures and by seeing how they can be manipu-
lated in imagination. [..] [M]athematical intuition does not correspond on
the scientific side to sense-perception, but to experimentation. (ib., p. 78)
Thus we get the following picture. Building an axiomatic theory is a complicated two-way
process; it is a game with Nature (and perhaps also with Society) where raw empirical
and intuitive data effect one’s axiomatic construction in progress while this construction
in its turn effects back one’s choice of further data, which become in this way less raw
and more structured. Asking where the process starts is the chicken or the egg kind of
question. Hintikka’s IF logic with its intended game-theoretic semantics provides a precise
mathematical model for such games [36].
My concern is about the kind of games that we need to play with Nature for doing science
and mathematics. Although yes-no questioning games indeed play an important role in
science and perhaps also in mathematics I claim that this is only the top of an iceberg. The
main body of this iceberg is filled by mathematical and empirical constructive activities
such as designing new experiments. Considering applications of mathematics outside the
pure science we may also mention the importance of mathematics for engineering. In order
to design a bridge or a particle accelerator one usually plays with certain mathematical
models of these things, not with formal axioms.
Since such activities qualify as instances of Hintikka’s “active thought-experiment” I hardly
diverge from Hintikka up to this point. The divergence comes next. I don’t grant Hin-
tikka’s view according to which the mathematical thought experimentation is, generally, a
spontaneous activity, which should be studied by “empirical psychologists” rather than lo-
gicians and epistemologists (ib. p. 83). I observe that constructive axiomatic theories like
Euclid’s geometry, Newton’s mechanics, Lawvere’s axiomatic Topos theory and Voevod-
sky’s HoTT-UF greatly increase one’s capacities of mathematical thought experimentation
by providing basic elements (like points and straight lines in Euclid) and precise rules (like
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Euclid’s Postulates) for it. I understand that the spontaneity may play a creative role
in mathematics and science just like elsewhere but I claim that typically a constructive
axiomatic organization of science and mathematics makes the thought experimentations in
these fields richer and more powerful. Compare playing with pieces of wood with playing
chess. Such an organized but rather than wholly spontaneous mathematical thought ex-
perimentation is typically used for building mathematical models of physical phenomena,
designing bridges, particle accelerators etc.
What is at issue here is how an axiomatic theory controls its semantic contents. Propo-
sitional axiomatic theory T (i.e. an axiomatic theory in the standard sense) motivated
by certain intended model M controls M through the truth-evaluation of its axioms and
theorems in M . Following Hintikka I shall understand the relation of logical inference in
T as the semantic consequence relation. Having granted this I claim that such a method
of axiomatic control is not effective because the concept of semantic consequence is highly
sensitive to one’s basic semantical setting. As long as the semantic consequence is discussed
with respect to intuitive structures coming from the air (intuition, free choice, experience)
it remains an imprecise intuitive idea itself. I agree with Hintikka that this fact does not
imply that one has here the choice between appealing to irrational resources and giving
up the semantical view on logical consequence altogether (ib., p. 77-78). In order to con-
strue the relation of semantic consequence with a mathematical precision one should fix
some formal semantics, which allows for doing the truth-evaluation properly (like in the
case of Kripke-Joyal semantics for topos logic) 23. For this end one needs to build a basic
mathematical model (in the sense of “model” used in science rather than Model theory)
of the appropriate class of intended structures suggested us by intuition, experience and
23 In order to construe a notion of semantic consequence for given formal language L one needs to
- fix a formal semantics M for that language
- take a collections AT of well-formed formulas of L (which may express axioms of a given theory T
formalized with L)
- specify the class M(AT ) of models of AT by evaluating formulas from AT in M
Formula φ is called a semantic consequence of AT , in symbols AT |= φ, iff φ is a tautology in M(AT ).
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what not. The yes-no questioning games by themselves cannot bring about such a basic
semantic model because, recall, the wanted model is supposed to allow us to make the
truth-evaluation properly. Unless such a semantic framework is established one is not in
a position to give to yes-no questions definite answers. The wanted semantic framework
cannot be obtained from intuition and experience directly but it can be built through
appropriate mathematical constructive procedures.
The above analysis suggests that the truth-evaluation is an advanced rather than basic fea-
ture of mathematical and other theories 24. Unlike Topos theory, HoTT in its existing form
has no resources for doing truth-evaluation internally. But there is a “general consensus”
that an internal truth-evaluation for HoTT can be construed within a higher-order topos
structure in which HoTT would play the role of internal language ([6], p. 12).
Mathematics and science not only seek truths and logical relations between those truths
but also look for effective methods of doing this and that. These two kinds of knowledge are
known in the literature as the knowledge-that and the knowledge-how [8]. The former kind
of knowledge is propositional but the latter is not. From historical and biological points of
view it appears plain that the knowledge-how is a more primitive form of knowledge, which
can be reasonably attributed to certain other animals than humans. Propositional knowl-
edge is more advanced and special and it can hardly exist without a developed human-like
language. This is why it is plausible that the knowledge-how does not necessarily depend
on some knowledge-that. At the same time at least such a developed form of knowledge-
that as a propositional axiomatic theory clearly does depend on certain knowledge-how,
namely, on the logical knowledge of how to derive theorems from the axioms. In this paper
I have shown that this logical knowledge-how in its turn requires knowing how to build
certain mathematical construction of non-propositional types.
24 In that sense I agree with Hilbert when in [11] he claims the priority of the propositional axiomatic
presentation over the non-propositional genetic presentation (see Section 3 above). However I disagree with
the view according to which a final form of propositional axiomatic presentation can and should not depend
of any genetic presentation (whether or not this latter view is Hilbert’s).
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As far as we are talking about logical and epistemological analysis of scientific knowledge
there is a tendency to reduce such knowledge to the relevant knowledge-that and separate
the associated knowledge-how (perhaps except the purely logical knowledge-how) either
into the special domain applied science (and applied mathematics) or into the special do-
main of scientific practice. In this paper I have shown that such a separation doesn’t work
for certain mathematical theories because in these cases the two types of knowledge are
interlaced at the very atomic level of theoretical reasoning. On the basis of the episte-
mological considerations presented in this Section I conjecture that the studied cases are
not exceptional, so the received notion of axiomatic theory as a bare system of proposi-
tions cannot be an adequate theoretical model of an average mathematical theory. The
lack of substantial applications of the received form of the axiomatic method in today’s
mainstream experimental science stressed by Fraassen back in 1980 [51]) suggest that the
received notion of axiomatic theory does not adequately represent physical and other sci-
entific theories either.
On the positive side I proposed in this paper a notion of constructive axiomatic theory,
which can present the knowledge-how (in the form of systems of rules) and the knowledge-
that (in the usual propositional form). The epistemological considerations presented above
in this Section suggest that this sort of axiomatic theories may be more appropriate in
science than the axiomatic theories in the received sense of the term. For recent attempts
to apply (what I call) the constructive axiomatic approach in physics see [44], [45]. This
issue needs a separate discussion, which I leave for another occasion.
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